The Sabah state government has made clear its resolve to defend immigration powers that remain central to its constitutional position within Malaysia, rejecting any potential encroachment by the newly established Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS). Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly, Datuk Joniston Bangkuai, the Assistant Minister to the Chief Minister, underscored that Sabah has formally communicated its position to the federal government, insisting that implementation of the Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency Act 2024 (Act 860) cannot diminish the state's autonomous control over border entry points.
The substance of Sabah's objection extends beyond symbolic recognition. The state government is particularly concerned about maintaining operational control through the Sabah State Immigration Department, which continues to serve as the principal agency responsible for managing who enters and exits the state. More specifically, Sabah wants to preserve its authority to issue Not-To-Land (NTL) notices—formal directives that prohibit individuals from entering Sabah territory. These instruments have proven critical for managing irregular migration, organised crime networks, and other security challenges unique to the state's geographical position and demographics.
While Joniston acknowledged that the new Act operates within federal legislative jurisdiction, he emphasised that Sabah interprets the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) as providing explicit constitutional protection for the state's immigration autonomy. Article V of MA63 is the legal bedrock on which Sabah bases its claim, and state officials have characterised these protections as non-negotiable and beyond the reach of subsequent federal legislation. This argument reflects a broader constitutional debate in Malaysia about the balance between federal authority and state rights, particularly regarding the special status accorded to Sabah and Sarawak when they joined the federation sixty years ago.
The government's position was articulated in response to a parliamentary question from Datuk Seri Wilfred Madius Tangau, who sought clarification on why Sabah had postponed implementation of Act 860. The question itself highlighted growing parliamentary scrutiny of how federal agencies interact with state governance structures. By escalating the matter to the State Legislative Assembly, where it received official government response, Sabah has signalled that this is not a minor administrative dispute but a constitutional principle requiring sustained political attention.
Chief Minister Datuk Seri Hajiji Noor had previously indicated, in May of this year, that the state would delay adopting the new Act pending explicit federal assurances. Those assurances would need to guarantee that Sabah's special rights, immigration autonomy, and state authority would remain completely protected. Hajiji framed this not as obstruction but as a necessary precondition for accepting federal border control mechanisms. His public statements have consistently linked Sabah's agreement to MA63 itself—arguing that the immigration autonomy provisions were a prerequisite for Sabah's accession to the federation, making them foundational rather than negotiable.
This confrontation between Sabah and federal authorities reflects deeper tensions about how Malaysia's constitutional arrangements accommodate federal centralisation while respecting state autonomy. The Malaysia Border Control and Protection Agency was likely established to address fragmented border security responses and improve coordination across the country. However, like many federal initiatives, its implementation encountered unexpected resistance from a state government that perceives threats to constitutionally guaranteed powers. For federal policymakers, navigating this tension requires either substantive compromise or a federal court determination that settles competing claims to authority.
The stakes for Sabah extend beyond immigration administration. The state faces unique challenges including proximity to southern Philippines conflict zones, trafficking networks targeting vulnerable workers, and significant irregular maritime migration. These factors mean that immigration control capability is intimately connected to state security and economic management. Surrendering control to a federal agency answerable to Kuala Lumpur creates risks that Sabah officials believe exceed benefits from centralised coordination.
From a Malaysian federalism perspective, Sabah's stance illustrates how special arrangements embedded in founding agreements can persist as friction points across changing administrations. The Malaysia Agreement provisions were designed to reassure Sabah and Sarawak about their place in the new federation. Sixty years later, disputes continue partly because the original constitutional language permits differing interpretations. Federal officials may view the new Act as a technical modernisation of border control, while Sabah sees potential constitutional erosion requiring explicit protective language.
The matter also carries implications for Sarawak, which possesses similar MA63 guarantees and has historically aligned with Sabah on constitutional autonomy questions. Any settlement reached with Sabah will likely establish precedent affecting Sarawak's own negotiations with federal authorities. This multiplier effect means that resolving the Act 860 dispute cleanly will require careful constitutional reasoning that both states find acceptable.
Moving forward, the federal government faces a choice between negotiating substantive modifications to the Act's implementation in Sabah, seeking explicit constitutional clarification through judicial processes, or attempting legislative amendment that acknowledges state immigration rights. Joniston's remarks suggest Sabah is prepared for sustained negotiation rather than capitulation, making this a test case for how modern Malaysia manages tensions between centralisation and constitutional federalism.
